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ABSTRACT 
                                                    
We examine the “value” a PBC form provides for publicly-traded corporations.  We analyze the 
structure of the PBC form and find that other than requiring a designated social purpose it does 
not differ significantly in siting control and direction with shareholders.  We also examine the 
purpose statements in the charters of the most economically significant PBCs.  We find that, 
independent of structural limitations on accountability, these purpose statements are, in most 
cases, too vague and aspirational to be legally significant, or even to serve as a reliable checks on 
PBC behavior.  We theorize, and provide evidence, that without a legal or structural tool for 
binding a PBC to specific social objectives, the operational decisions of the publicly traded PBC 
may be subject to change according to the vision and preferences of individual officers, directors 
and shareholders.  Our conclusions provide support for a more defined and enforceable PBC 
purpose statement for publicly-traded PBCs.  Otherwise, publicly-traded PBCs are likely to 
operate no differently than traditional, publicly-traded corporations.   
 
Introduction  
 
The Public Benefit Corporation (“PBC”) is a new corporate form that allows the corporation 
to identify its objectives in terms of broader social or environmental responsibility rather than 
focusing exclusively on profit maximization.  The specific requirements and attributes of the PBC 
vary from state to state, but a substantial number of PBCs -- particularly those that have received 
venture funding and all three PBCs that are currently publicly traded -- are formed under the 
Delaware PBC statute.1  In August 2020, Delaware amended its statute to make it easier for 
existing PBCs to convert back to traditional corporations (and vice-versa).2 The amendment, and 
the increased freedom it provides to shareholders to abandon the PBC form, raises the question of 
what value the PBC statute provides to a corporation and whether the benefits of the PBC can be 
maintained in a publicly-traded company.   
 
 
 Jill E. Fisch is the Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School; Steven 
Davidoff Solomon is Professor of Law at the University of California Berkeley, School of Law. We thank Elizabeth Pollmann and 
Robert Thompson for comments and Sophie Wang for excellent research assistance.   
1 See generally Michael B. Dorff, WHY PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATIONS?, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77 (2017).  In some other states the 
PBC is simply known as a benefit corporation but the form and goals are similar. 
2 An Act To Amend Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to the General Corporation Law, House Bill 341, 150 th General 
Assembly, signed Jul. 16, 2020, at §17.  The statute simultaneously made it easier for traditional corporations to convert to the 
PBC form. 
This chapter takes up that question and evaluates the potential that the PBC form offers for 
publicly-traded companies that want to adopt a social purpose or a stakeholder orientation.    
Drawing upon our other work on corporate purpose, we focus in particular on the claim that the 
election of PBC status provides a meaningful difference in either the structure of the corporation 
or the legal constraints on corporate decision-makers.3  We review the relevant PBC statutes to 
determine whether the PBC form provides a realistic mechanism for shifting from the shareholder 
primacy norm in favor of stakeholder governance.  We conclude that it does not; rather, we 
conclude that the PBC preserves the shareholder primacy norm by vesting shareholders – as in the 
traditional corporation --- with ultimate power and control over the PBC and the implementation 
of its purpose.  As a result, the PBC’s commitment to social purpose is only as strong as the 
willingness of its shareholders to prioritize social value in addition to or at the expense of profit. 
In addition, the statutory structure imposes greater limits on shareholders’ ability to use litigation 
to hold corporate decisionmakers accountable than the traditional corporation.  As a result, while 
the selection of the PBC form may indicate a desire of corporate participants to commit to social 
purpose, we argue that choosing the PBC form reflects more of a signal of some type of social 
commitment rather than an affirmative obligation. 
 
We go on to explore the manner in which PBCs articulate their commitment to social purpose.  
We collect a sample of the most economically significant PBCs and examine the purpose 
statements in their charters.  We find that, independent of structural limitations on accountability, 
these purpose statements are, in most cases, too vague and aspirational to be legally significant, or 
even to serve as a reliable tool for evaluating whether corporate decisionmakers are adhering to 
the PBC’s social mission.  We note that this concern is similar to that which plagues efforts to 
“repurpose” the traditional corporation to promote the interests of stakeholders.4   
 
The continued importance of shareholder primacy for PBCs coupled with the vagueness of 
their articulated purposes raise two concerns.  As we have highlighted in prior work, every 
corporation specifies a corporate purpose in its charter.5  But if the specified corporate purpose is 
vague or undefined, then it is effectively unenforceable since there is nothing to enforce.6  In such 
a case, the shareholder primacy structure of the corporation, as well as market pressure for 
publicly-traded PBCs, predominates to steer the direction of the company.7  As we highlight in 
this Chapter, for these purposes, PBCs have the same mechanisms of shareholder control as a 
traditional corporation – shareholder power to elect the board and shareholder power to impose 
capital market discipline.  A vague purpose constrains neither manager or shareholder authority, 
leaving the PBC subject to purpose drift, opportunism, or a shift in shareholder priorities.   Without 
a legal or structural tool for binding a PBC to specific social objectives, the operational decisions 
of the publicly traded PBC may be subject to change according to the vision and preferences of 
individual officers, directors and shareholders.   
 
 
3 Jill Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose? (draft dated Aug. 2020). 
4 Id. at 12-15. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 14-15. 
7 See Leo Strine, Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence from My Hometown, 33(2) OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL. 
176 (2017) (arguing that stockholder power translates into shareholder primacy as corporate purpose). 
We highlight these concerns by discussing specific examples. These include the case of Etsy 
which started as a publicly-traded B-Corp. with an espoused intent to become a PBC.  When Etsy 
failed to meet earnings targets, it was targeted by shareholder activists and forced to abandon its 
B-Corp identification and PBC goal.8  We also discuss Unilever’s purchase of Ben & Jerry’s, one 
of the first pioneering socially-oriented companies, and the changes in Ben & Jerry’s mission 
resulting from this purchase.    
 
Our findings have practical implications for the PBC debate. First, we question whether 
adoption of the PBC form is a viable tool for forcing “bad” corporations to act in a more socially 
responsible manner. Although some commentators advocate mandatory PBCs for certain 
categories of publicly-traded companies as a means of compelling their operations to incorporate 
societal or public interests, they are likely overstating the effect of such a requirement.9  We 
question how the formal PBC designation will result in any operational change at companies that 
lack an independent commitment by existing shareholders to social purpose.  Second, our findings 
suggest the value of a more rigorous PBC model.  We argue that PBCs should be required to 
specifically designate a formal purpose which is capable of assessment and implementation.  Such 
a model would enable shareholders to make a meaningful commitment as well as addressing 
allocational issues and priorities among competing social values.  Finally we observe that existing 
PBC statutes impose constraints on holding PBCs accountable to their identified social purpose 
and identify potential mechanisms for increasing accountability.   
 
 The Chapter proceeds as follows.  In Part I, we briefly describe the PBC and situate PBCs 
in the current debate over corporate purpose, delineating how PBC statutes purport to facilitate the 
pursuit by corporations of multiple purposes.10  Part II situates the PBC framework within 
traditional concepts of shareholder control and argues that, contrary to the claims of some 
commentators, the PBC reinforces the shareholder primacy norm.  Part III examines and analyzes 
current use of the PBC form, focusing on PBCs’ legal statements of purpose.  We highlight the 
fact that many of the largest and most visible PBCs have adopted vague and aspirational statements 
of social purpose.  Part IV explains why both shareholder primacy and the absence of meaningful 
statements of purpose undercut the publicly-traded PBCs ability to make a meaningful 
commitment.  We conclude by calling for more definable purpose in publicly-traded PBCs in order 
to fulfill the PBC’s potential and identifying structural changes that can aid in making such a 
purpose statement enforceable.11    
 
8 See David Gelles, Inside the Revolution at Etsy, THE N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2017, at B1. 
9 Leo E. Strine Jr & Dorothy S. Lund, How to restore strength and fairness to our economy, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Apr. 10, 
2020, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/business/dealbook/coronavirus-corporate-governance.html (last accessed 
Sept. 15, 2020) (“Public and large private companies receiving bailouts or pandemic-related subsidies could be required to 
become public benefit corporations under state law, and others could be given positive incentives to do the same.”) 
10 PBC statutes differ in their approach.  Delaware requires a PBC to identify a specific public benefit as a component of the 
corporation’s purpose.  Many other PBC statutes require a PBC to pursue a general public benefit, which typically is defined as a 
"material positive impact on society and the environment as a whole."  Some states do both, enabling corporations to specify a 
specific public benefit but also requiring that the PBC serve the   general public interest.  See Lyman Johnson, Managerial Duties 
in Social Enterprise: The Public Benefit Corporation, THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW, AT 505-512 (B. 
MEANS & J. YOCKEY, EDS. 2018).   
11 See Frederick Alexander, Putting Benefit Corporation Statutes into Context by Putting Context into the Statutes, 76 BUS. LAW. 
__  (forthcoming 2020)  (“if, as this paper argues, the concept of benefit governance can (and should) be used more broadly to 
address collective action issues that society is struggling to cope with, the opt in formula may act as a barrier—how can 
corporations address collective issues if only some are programmed to do so, while others continue to be programmed to graze 
the commons and perpetuate unfairness if those practices lead to the highest financial return on their equity?”) 
 
I. The Public Benefit Corporation 
 
A. Background 
 
 PBCs are a relatively recent innovation, designed by state statutes to solve the shareholder 
primacy dilemma by enabling a corporation to choose explicitly to pursue societal or stakeholder 
interests rather than focusing primarily or exclusively on shareholder economic value.  Although 
the precise scope of purposes that may be pursued through a PBC as well as the resulting 
obligations imposed on corporate decisionmakers vary substantially depending on the applicable 
statute, the core rationale for the PBC form is that it allows a corporation simultaneously to pursue 
both economic profits and social benefits.   
 
 A private organization known as B Lab was the driving force behind benefit corporation 
statutes.12  B Lab drafted a model statute and urged state legislatures to adopt it.13  Maryland 
adopted the first benefit corporation statute in 2010, and today thirty-eight have adopted some 
variation of a benefit corporation statute.14  Although there is a fair degree of variation among the 
statutes,15 they share the common objective of creating a vehicle for social enterprise that is 
situated somewhere between a traditional for-profit corporation and a non-profit.  Specifically, 
benefit corporations are designed to permit corporations and their boards to reject economic 
stockholder value as the corporation’s exclusive objective in favor of some form of stakeholder or 
societal value.16  They do so by redefining the pursuit of the corporation’s identified social purpose 
as an action in the best interests of the corporation.17 
 
 The PBC business form is seeing increasing adoption though it is still far from ubiquitous.  In 
the last year, the number of PBCs formed under these statutes has doubled to over 10,000.18 In 
addition, as one of the co-authors of this Article has documented elsewhere, PBCs regularly draw 
in significant investment from venture capital and other funds.19  This investment is a sign of the 
PBC’s growing acceptance in the financial world, including in the IPO market.  
 
 
12 Id. at 3. (“The initial efforts at drafting and advocating for benefit corporations laws were undertaken by B Lab, a nonprofit 
entity based in Pennsylvania.”) 
13 B Lab’s draft statute was the Model Benefit Corporation Law.  See THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT 
CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, 
ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC (Jan. 18, 2013), available at 
https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf (describing the model law).  Initiative for the 
benefit corporation may also have stemmed from the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in   
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (2010).  See Johnson, supra note 10. 
14  Frederick Alexander, et al., From Shareholder Primacy to Stakeholder Capitalism A Policy Agenda for Systems Change, Sept. 
7, 2020, at 7, https://theshareholdercommons.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/From-Shareholder-Primacy-to-Stakeholder-
Capitalism-TSC-and-B-Lab-White-Paper.pdf.  See also Dan Brown, Hanna Downing, Ava Haghighi, & Carolina Henriquez-
Schmitz, Mapping the State of Social Enterprise and the Law (2018-2019), available at https://socentlawtracker.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/Grunin-TepperReport_5_30_B.pdf (Last accessed March 20, 2020) (counting thirty-five states in the 
U.S. and the District of Columbia as having adopted benefit corporation statutes or social purpose corporation statutes). 
15 See Alexander, supra note 11, at 4-16 (describing differences between the Model Benefit Corporation Law, the Delaware 
Public Benefit Corporation Statute, the ABA Model Benefit Corporation Act, and the statutes adopted by several non-U.S. 
jurisdictions). 
16 Notably, PBCs provide for but do not maximize or privilege pecuniary gain for shareholders.  See Johnson, supra note 10, at 
504-5. 
17 In that regard, the PBC is different from the certified B corporation, a standard-setting organization that provides guidelines 
with which corporations can voluntarily choose to comply. 
18 Alexander, et al., supra note 14.   
19 See Michael Dorff, James Hicks, & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Future or Fancy? An Empirical Study of Public Benefit 
Corporations, HARV. BUS L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
  There are currently three publicly-traded PBCs.  The first Laureate Education, is a private-
equity sponsored for-profit provider of higher education, and it went public in 2017.  Recently, 
Lemonade made headlines both by going public as a PBC and by becoming 2020’s best IPO debut, 
with its stock closing up 139% after the first day of trading.  In the wake of Lemonade Vital Farms, 
Inc. also went public as a PBC.20  A fourth company recently announced that it is exploring the 
prospect of converting to a PBC – Veeva Systems.21  If Veeva converts to a PBC, it would be the 
first Russell 1000 company to do so.22  As we noted in the introduction, recent changes in Delaware 
corporate law that allow a corporation to freely convert to a PBC by amending its charter with the 
approval of the board of directors and a simple majority of outstanding shares are expected to 
further encourage publicly-traded companies to adopt the PBC form.23  A second reason for the 
expected rise in publicly traded PBCs is renewed calls for stakeholder capitalism, a movement we 
take up in the next subsection.  
 
B. The PBC as a Vehicle for Stakeholder Capitalism  
 
 Calls for publicly-traded corporations to embrace stakeholder capitalism, in which officers 
and directors consider – or even privilege – the interests of stakeholders over those of shareholders 
have swept the world.24  The demand that corporations adopt a new and enlightened corporate 
purpose that serves the interests of stakeholders and the general public is reflected in policy 
statements by a number of influential organizations.  Perhaps the most prominent statement came 
from the Business Roundtable, which made international headlines25 when it issued a statement in 
August 2019 replacing its former endorsement of shareholder primacy with the proposition that 
publicly traded corporations adopt a purpose pledging to be run for the benefit of all stakeholders 
– customers, employees, suppliers, communities and shareholders.”26   
 
The dislocations and inequalities highlighted by the coronavirus pandemic have heightened 
the demand for corporate governance to respond, and many commentators view stakeholder 
capitalism for publicly traded companies as a productive way of increasing attention to the needs 
of a broader swarth of societal interests.27  Commentators frequently identify PBCs as a tool that 
enables corporations to commit publicly to the values behind stakeholder governance both because 
PBCs provide corporate decisionmakers with the legal authority to depart from the mandate of 
 
20 See Vital Farms, Inc., Registration Statement on Form S-1, dated. July 9, 2020.  
21 Veeva Forms Board Committee to Explore Becoming a Public Benefit Corporation, BUSINESSWIRE, Sept. 16, 2020, 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200916005282/en/Veeva-Forms-Board-Committee-to-Explore-Becoming-a-Public-
Benefit-Corporation. 
22 Id. 
23 See Potter Anderson Corroon, LLP, Delaware Makes it Easier for Corporations to Become Public Benefit Corporations, Jul. 
20, 2020, available at https://www.potteranderson.com/newsroom-news-Delaware-Makes-it-Easier-for-Corporations-to-Become-
Public-Benefit-Corporations.html (last accessed (Oct. 1, 2020). 
24 See Richard Samans & Jane Nelson, Taking stakeholder capitalism from principle to practice, World Economic Forum, Jan. 
20, 2020, available at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/01/stakeholder-capitalism-principle-practice-better-business/  
(citing a range of organizations and regulatory frameworks that have embraced stakeholder capitalism). 
25 See, e.g., Jim Ludema & Amber Johnson, The Purpose Of The Corporation? Business Roundtable Advances The Conversation, 
Now We All Need To Contribute, FORBES, Aug. 20, 2019, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/amberjohnson-
jimludema/2019/08/20/the-purpose-of-the-corporation/#25c6fd5b3846; Group of US corporate leaders ditch shareholder first 
mantra, THE FIN. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2019, available at https://www.ft.com/content/e21a9fac-c1f5-11e9-a8e9-296ca66511c9 
26 See Business Roundtable, Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves 
All Americans’, Aug. 19, 2019, available at https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-
corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans.  
27 Peter Geogescu, The Aspirations For Stakeholder Capitalism Must Be Very, Very High, FORBES, Jun. 10, 2020, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/justcapital/2020/06/10/the-aspirations-for-stakeholder-capitalism-must-be-very-very-
high/#6b3e8aaa73e1; https://www.businessinsider.com/b-lab-cofounder-talks-coronavirus-and-stakeholder-capitalism-2020-3 
making operational decisions with the exclusive goal of maximizing economic value for 
shareholders.28   
 
Although we have questioned elsewhere the extent to which shareholder primacy is a legal 
mandate,29 PBC statutes explicitly reject the proposition that the corporation’s best interests are 
defined exclusively in terms of shareholder economic wealth.  In addition many PBC statutes 
expressly direct corporate decisionmakers to consider the interests of non-shareholder 
stakeholders.  Delaware’s statute, for example, requires the corporation to be managed in a manner 
that balances shareholders’ pecuniary interests with “the best interests of those materially affected 
by the corporation’s conduct.”  The Model Benefit Corporation Act requires directors to “consider, 
to the extent affected, in addition to the interests of shareholders generally, the separate interests 
of stakeholders known to be affected by the business of the corporation.”30  Similarly the 
Pennsylvania statute requires directors of a benefit corporation to consider the effects of their 
actions on the various corporate stakeholders including shareholders, customers, employees and 
the community.31   
 
 The availability of the PBC form as a vehicle for stakeholder capitalism has its greatest 
potential impact in the publicly-traded corporation.32  Many private companies have a controlling 
stockholder or a control group that is committed to an identified social purpose.33  The challenge 
for them is how to retain that commitment when the company goes public and shareholders become 
more dispersed.  Although, as noted above, there are currently only three publicly-traded PBCs.  
One question is whether the PBC form is a viable tool for insulating a corporation from pressure 
to forsake its public purpose when it enters the public markets.  In addition, existing traditional 
corporations are facing pressure to reconsider their missions and to commit to a socially-oriented 
or stakeholder purpose.  Although we have questioned whether the PBC form is necessary for a 
corporation to do so, conversion clearly signals the corporation’s desire to be governed by a 
different standard.34  In the next section we analyze the PBC structure to see if it supports these 
objectives in the publicly-traded company.  
 
II. The PBC and Shareholder Primacy 
 
 Although the statutes expressly authorize or require PBCs to consider stakeholder or 
societal interests in addition to those of shareholders, they do not implement revisions to either the 
 
28 See, e.g., J. Haskell Murray,  Defending Patagonia: Mergers and Acquisitions with Benefit Corporations, 9 HASTINGS BUS. 
L.J. 485, 493-494 (2013) (explaining that benefit corporation legislation provides “that the purpose of a benefit corporation is not 
shareholder wealth maximization but rather a "general public benefit.”).  
29 See Fisch & Davidoff, supra note 3, at 115-123. 
30 MBCA §18.04. 
31 PA §3321. 
32 In contrast, in the private corporation, the company can generally reflect the values of its small group of shareholders. Thus, 
Hobby Lobby and Chick-Fil-a can implement religious values by closing on Sundays and craigslist can deliberately limit profits.  
In that paradigm the value of a PBC is open to question and may be more of a signaling device.  See Dorff, supra note 1. 
Regardless we believe the legal effects and consequences of PBC status are significantly different in the private and public 
company sphere, a distinction which has yet to receive significant analysis outside this Article.  
33 See, e.g., Justin Blount and Kwabena Offei-Danso, The Benefit Corporation: A Questionable Solution to a Non-Existent 
Problem, 44 ST. MARY'S L. J. 617, 668-669 (2013) (citing examples of companies that use their capital structures to ensure that 
founders or like-minded investors can maintain their commitment to the corporation’s social mission). 
34 See Fisch & Davidoff, supra note 3, at 132. 
power structure or the decisionmaking apparatus of the traditional corporation.  Instead, the PBC 
statutes in their current form retain the identical role for shareholders as in the traditional publicly-
traded corporation. We thus have no reason to believe that the same dynamics and forces which 
shape a traditional publicly traded corporation’s mission and purpose will have anything other than 
identical effects in the publicly traded PBC.  
 
 Delaware’s PBC statute is illustrative of the powers and rights of shareholders in the PBC.  
A significant number of venture-funded PBCs have formed under the Delaware statute,35 and it is 
also likely to be the one chosen by any public companies that decide to be PBCs.36  It is therefore 
worthwhile to focus on the Delaware statute in particular.  In Delaware, as in most states, the PBC 
provisions are part of the general corporation law.  Delaware’s PBC provisions consist of eight 
sections.37   Apart from these sections, the general provisions of the DGCL apply.38   
 
Chart A compares the statutory control rights of shareholders in a PBC, shareholders in a 
traditional corporation, and other PBC stakeholders:  
 
Chart A: Comparison of Shareholders Rights in PBCs and Traditional Corporations  
 Traditional 
Shareholders 
PBC Shareholders Other PBC 
Stakeholders 
Election of PBC 
Status 
Yes Yes No 
Elimination of PBC 
Status 
Yes Yes No 
Election of Directors Yes Yes No 
Removal of Directors Yes Yes No 
Merger or Sale of 
ALL or Substantially 
All of the Assets 
Yes Yes No 
Amendment of 
Charter  
Yes Yes No 
Amendment of By-
laws 
Yes Yes No 
Liquidation Rights Yes Yes No 
Right to Bring 
Derivative Suits 
Yes Yes No 
Protected by 
Fiduciary Duties 
Yes Yes No 
Right to Enforce 
PBC Purpose and 
Mission 
N/A Yes No 
   
 
35 See Dorff et al., supra note 19.  
36 All three PBCs which have gone public Laureate Education, Lemonade and Vital Farms have all done so as Delaware 
incorporated PBCs. 
37 See D.G.C.L. §§ 361-368. 
38 The net effect is to preserve the substantial shareholder rights which exist in the traditional corporation without significant 
deviation. 
 As the chart demonstrates, shareholders in Delaware PBCs retain the same degree of 
authority that they have in traditional corporations with respect to controlling corporate decision-
making, directly and indirectly.  Specifically, it is shareholders, and only shareholders, who elect 
the board of directors.  Only shareholders vote on structural changes such as amendments to the 
charter and bylaws, mergers and reincorporations.  Shareholders have the exclusive authority to 
convert a traditional corporation into a PBC and the right to convert back - in both cases by a 
simple majority vote.  Only shareholders are protected by director and officer fiduciary duties, and 
only shareholders have the right to address wrongdoing by those directors and officers through 
litigation.   
   
 Publicly-traded corporations face the additional consideration that only shareholders can 
impose capital market discipline on them.  More specifically, shareholders trade the corporation’s 
stock and therefore determine its price.  Those trades are likely to be based, in large part, on the 
PBCs ability to produce earnings and value.  Critically, even if some shareholders value non-
economic aspects of the PBC’s mission, prices are set by the marginal shareholder.39  This trading 
discipline will push management to adhere to a perspective which creates shareholder value.  And 
the failure to adhere to create shareholder value, that is, economic value, will produce shareholder 
action in the form of proxy or other contests.  It will also bring in the disciplining force of the 
M&A market which will operate in the same manner as for a traditional corporation – a prospective 
bidder will set its offer price based on its ability to extract economic value.  And finally, we do not 
discern a noticeable difference in incentive compensation in the three publicly-traded PBCs and 
other corporations.40  This incentive structure will replicate management’s focus on the stock price 
and economic performance.   
   
 As the chart indicates, although state statutes enable PBCs to identify an alternative social 
purpose, the statutes reserve to shareholders the right to enforce that purpose. Stakeholders lack 
any enforcement rights, even if a PBC explicitly identifies its mission as pursuing the interests of 
those stakeholders.  Moreover, enforcement of the corporation’s purpose even by shareholders is 
more difficult in the PBC than in a traditional corporation.  In Delaware, the PBC statute limits the 
right to bring a lawsuit to enforce the directors duties under the statute to shareholders who own 
2% or more of the corporation’s stock.41  Other states authorize specific benefit enforcement 
proceedings but limit the power to initiative such proceedings to shareholders who own 5% or 
more of the corporation’s stock.42  In a publicly traded PBC, these larger shareholders are more 
likely to be institutional or other shareholders with fiduciary duties to their investors.  These 
institutional shareholders have fiduciary duties to their own investors which will make it unlikely 
that they will bring a suit to reallocate the corporation’s funds to its secondary non-profit purpose. 
To the extent they are available, enforcement proceedings only provide for potential injunctive 
 
39 See, e.g., Albert H. Choi & Eric Talley, Appraising the "Merger Price" Appraisal Rule, 34 J. L. ECOON. & ORG. 543 (2018) 
(observing that “The marginal shareholder effectively determines trading price, since her value reflects the lowest asking price 
for the stock….”).  Notably, because a substantial percentage of the institutional money managed by firms that publicly articulate 
a commitment to social purpose is indexed, such investors are price takers whose views about social value do not influence their 
trading decisions.  See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street: A 
Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 37 (2019) (explaining that “passive funds, by their very 
nature, must hold both the good and bad companies in their index.”). 
40 For example, shortly after going public, Lemonade adopted an incentive award program in which it registered 3.75 million 
shares to be awarded to its officers and directors.  See Lemonade, Inc. Form S-8 dated July 2, 2020, 
https://sec.report/Document/0001104659-20-080564/.  
41 D.G.C.L. § 367. 
42 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1362(c) (“A benefit enforcement proceeding may be commenced or maintained 
only (1) directly by the benefit corporation, or (2) derivatively in accordance with the provisions of chapter 601 by (A) a person 
or group of persons that owns beneficially or of record not less than five per cent of the total number of shares of a class or series 
outstanding at the time of the act or omission complained of . . . .”).  Similarly, the MBCA limits enforcement proceedings to 5% 
shareholders.  MBCA § 18.06(c).   
relief; PBC statutes do not allow for the award of money damages in connection with a failure to 
adhere to the corporation’s social purpose.43 
 
 Moreover, PBC statutes often provide broad discretion to directors to implement the PBC’s 
mission as specified in the PBC charter.  They expressly provide that disinterested failure to 
comply with PBC director duties does not constitute lack of good faith or breach of the duty of 
loyalty.  They also expand the scope of the traditional business judgment rule.  The Delaware 
statute, for example, articulates the necessary standard of conduct for PBC directors as “both 
informed and disinterested and not such that no person of ordinary, sound judgment would 
approve.”44   
 
 Finally, PBC statutes often offer little in the way of compliance monitoring.  Most PBC 
statutes require that the PBC periodically report on the extent to which it had promoted its 
identified public benefits.45  This reporting may or may not require adherence to a third-party 
standard or outside certification.46  The  Delaware PBC statute, for example, allows for auditing 
and enforcement of the PBC mission, but outside certification for compliance with a PBC’s 
alternative purpose is not required unless stockholders elect to require it.47  And in Delaware even 
this disclosure mandate is limited by the fact that the mission is only enforceable by shareholders.48 
Those commentators who have studied compliance rates have consistently reported low levels of 
compliance.  For example, an early study by J. Haskel Murray reported compliance with state 
reporting requirements at a rate of 8-10%.49  Eric Franklin Amarante reported that only one of 697 
Nevada benefit corporations posted the required benefit report on its website.50  More recent work 
has reported that, although compliance rates vary, most are still well below 20%.51    
 
 Ultimately, an analysis of the PBC finds that, apart from its designated social purpose, it is 
structured in the same manner as a traditional corporation.  Meanwhile, existing law imposes few 
checks on PBC behavior designed to ensure enforcement of the PBC’s social purpose, and vehicles 
for shareholder enforcement appear weak at best.  If publicly-traded PBCs are to operate 
differently from traditional corporations, that result is unlikely to be a product of the PBC’s legal 
structure.  Moreover, to provide recourse if a PBC strayed from its designated objectives, even a 
more vigorous enforcement mechanism would require a more clearly-defined social purpose.  We 
take this point up in the next section.  
 
III. Examining Purpose in PBCs 
 
  Chart A highlights that the key structural mechanism differentiating PBCs from traditional 
corporations is their statement of purpose.  As noted above, PBC statutes generally allow or require 
a PBC to identify a secondary social purpose, but the statutes offer limited guidance as to what 
that statement of purpose is supposed to look like.   Notably, most PBC statutes do not provide 
affirmative guidance as to what constitutes a permissible corporate purpose.  The Delaware statute, 
for example, requires a PBC to identify one or more specific public benefits, which are defined as 
“a positive effect (or reduction of negative effects) on 1 or more categories of persons, entities, 
 
43 See, e.g., MBCA § 18.06(c).   
44 D.G.C.L. § 365. 
45 See generally Maxime Verheyden, Public Reporting by Benefit Corporations: Importance, Compliance, and 
Recommendations, 14 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 37 (2018) (describing legal requirements for benefit corporation reporting and 
analyzing reporting practices by benefit corporations in four states). 
46 See id. 
47  D.G.C.L. § 366. 
48 Id. at  § 367. 
49 J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA L. REV. 25, 34-35 (2015). 
50  Eric Franklin Amarante, Nudging Entrepreneurs into Noncompliance: Why Does Nevada Have so Many Benefit 
Corporations? [Blog Post] (September 23, 2016), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2897684. 
51 Verheyden, supra note 45. 
communities or interests (other than stockholders in their capacities as stockholders) including, 
but not limited to, effects of an artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, educational, environmental, 
literary, medical, religious, scientific or technological nature.”52 Statutes are largely agnostic 
between corporations that pursue a specific public benefit objective such as reducing climate 
change or promoting workplace safety and those that seek to operate within the framework 
espoused by purpose advocates such as limiting externalities, providing a net benefit to society or 
managing the corporation in the interests of all its stakeholders.53   
 
 That statutes do not mandate more specific guidelines for a PBC’s social purpose is neither 
surprising nor inherently problematic.  If the PBC form encourages a range of businesses to operate 
in a more socially responsible manner, after all, what is wrong with letting a thousand flowers 
bloom?  But it is critical to recognize the resulting shortcomings in what we can expect in terms 
of commitment.  A PBC does not commit, through its choice of business form, to minimize 
negative externalities from its operations.  It does not pledge to operate in a manner that furthers 
the interests of all those affected by its business. It need not promote a cleaner environment, 
workplace diversity or responsible supply chain practices.   
 
 Instead, PBCs themselves identify the principles by which they are to be evaluated, through 
their articulation of social purpose.  We turn then to an evaluation of the manner in which some of 
the largest PBCs do so.  To explore this question, we obtained the charters of 13 Delaware-
incorporated PBCs.  Exhibit A sets forth a list of these companies along with their PBC specified 
purpose.  These charters include the 3 publicly-traded PBCs (i.e., Laureate Education, Lemonade 
and Vital Farms).  The remaining 10 are the ten largest PBCs receiving outside venture capital 
investment as documented in a separate article by one of the co-authors.  We include these 10 
companies because they are the ones who are most likely to go public in the coming years (one of 
them, Lemonade already has) and have venture capital funds with fiduciary obligations to their 
investors as major stockholders.  As noted above, the Delaware PBC statute requires that PBCs 
identify at least one specific public benefit in their charter.  
 
 Although our sample is neither extensive nor necessarily representative of the universe of 
PBCs, we find that the purpose statements of the PBCs in our sample are largely vague and 
aspirational.  They do not provide shareholders and other interested stakeholders with meaningful 
guidance on their intended operations or priorities.  Nor do they enable shareholders to monitor 
effectively whether the PBC is complying with its stated goals.   
 
 Recently-public Lemonade, Inc. provides a good example.  Its stated purpose is to “harness 
technology and social impact to be the world’s most loved insurance company.”54  While this 
purpose appears to comply with the Delaware statutory requirement of a positive effect “of … a 
technological nature” the statement does not indicate the target audience whose love is sought – is 
it customers, employees, shareholders or someone else?  Does Lemonade seek to be loved by its 
 
52 D.G.C.L. § 362(b). 
53 Lyman Johnson characterizes these as two types of PBCs – a specific benefit corporation and a general benefit corporation and 
argues that the latter is required to pursue a net positive benefit on society.  Accordingly, a specific benefit corporation need only 
pursue its identified public benefit and is not required to prioritize all the stakeholders identified in materials such as the Business 
Roundtable statement.  See Johnson, supra note 10.  Further, as some commentators have noted, the language of some statutes is 
ambiguous on the relationship between specific and general purpose.  For example, a number of statutes require that the 
corporation’s directors “consider” the interest of a broad range of stakeholders, but the only obligations that are arguably 
enforceable relate to the corporation’s designated specific purpose. 
54 Wallace Witowski, Lemonade IPO: 5 things to know about the online insurer, MARKETWATCH, Jul. 2, 2020, available at 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/lemonade-ipo-5-things-to-know-about-the-online-insurer-2020-07-01 (last accessed, Sept. 
15, 2020). 
own customers or by customers of its competitors?  Is it to be loved for its competence in the 
insurance industry or for its collateral good works such as its charitable donations policy?   
 
 Other purpose statements are similar.  Vital Farms’ secondary purpose is to inter-alia 
“bring[] joy to our customers through products and services.”55  In the private sphere, Global 
Uprising PBC, sets forth as its purpose as: 
 
using its business to inspire social and environmental change that results in the 
improvement of the human condition, increased social consciousness and the amelioration 
of poverty.56 
 
 Ripple Foods, another private company that has taken substantial venture capital 
investment, has a similarly aspirational purpose.  Its purpose statement provides that “the 
Corporation shall have a public benefit purpose of producing a material positive impact on society 
and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard.”57  Arguably there 
are two advantages to this statement. First, Ripple has seemingly committed to a net positive 
impact, limiting its ability to focus on specific social goals at the potential expense of other 
interests.  Second, Ripple cites it commitment to having its actions evaluated against a third party 
standard.  On the other hand, what does it mean to produce a material positive impact taken as a 
whole?  May Ripple use less environmentally friendly packaging if it promotes customer safety?  
What are Ripple’s obligations to alert customers as to the nutritional differences between its milk 
alternative and the comparable dairy products?  And again, how do shareholders and others assess 
compliance with Ripple’s purpose, given the broad discretion that it provides?      
 
Ultimately, while we do not review all PBC corporate charters, the charters of the most 
economically significant PBCs and those that are publicly-traded put forth purpose statements so 
vague and aspirational that is it hard to think of them as providing any content or ability to monitor 
them in the public markets.  Indeed, in our sample, the only statement that appears to be capable 
of objective measurement is MPower, which has adopted “[t]he specific public benefit purpose of 
the corporation is: Lending to Students of Low-Income Backgrounds.”58  Notably, this is in line 
with the business of the company which is “[w]e’re a social benefit corporation founded by 
international students for international students, and we’re on a mission to make socioeconomic 
mobility borderless.”59 
 
 Mindful of the argument that people should be judged by their actions and not by their 
words, we further evaluate PBCs by their operational decisions.  Here we note the limitations of 
the PBC form in providing a standard by which to evaluate that conduct.  For example, charitable 
donations reflect a substantial component of Lemonade’s public identify.  Lemonade touts the 
program by which it allows customers to designate a charitable cause to which the company will 
donate residual premiums.  The overall amount of Lemonade’s donations through this program is 
 
55 Exhibit A.  
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 MPower Financing Website, available at https://www.mpowerfinancing.com/ (last accessed Sept. 15, 2020).  
limited, however, in comparison to charitable giving by traditional insurers.60  In fiscal 2019 
Lemonade donated $631 thousand total on revenue of $63 million, or approximately 1 percent of 
Lemonade’s total revenue.61  Lemonade’s donations increased to over a million dollars in fiscal 
2020, an amount larger than its donations for the previous three years combined.62 Significantly, 
however, Lemonade has yet to earn a profit.  Although shareholders may tolerate charitable 
donations that are small in overall dollar amount, for now, it is unclear how long they will continue 
to love a company that cannot navigate a path to profitability.63 
 
 Another prominent PBC is Kickstarter.  The Company states that its secondary “mission is 
to help bring creative projects to life; Kickstarter’s operations will reflect its values; Kickstarter 
supports a more creative and equitable world; Kickstarter is committed to the arts; and Kickstarter 
is committed to fighting inequality.”  In this regard the Company’s latest report promotes a host 
of social involvement including an environmental impact statement.64  The company also donates 
5% of its profits to charity for the arts and inequality.   
 
 However, while Kickstarter shows evidence of living up to its value, it was engaged in 
conflict with its own workers and allegedly terminated 2 of them for union organizing efforts. 65   
The employees of Kickstarter ultimately voted to unionize by a margin of 46 to 37 in an election 
held by the National Labor Relations Board.  Kickstarter opposed the unionization effort and its 
CEO resigned in the midst of the dispute.  In the wake of the coronavirus epidemic the company 
has stated it is laying off up to 45% of its staff.  To the extent that a PBC commits to operate so as 
to produce a net positive impact on society, how does one weigh Kickstarter’s social involvement 
against the potentially negative impact it has had on its employees?   
 
 Our point here is not to make a normative statement on Kickstarter’s or Lemonade’s social 
welfare efforts. Nor is to state that all PBCs should be perfect in some normative social purpose 
manner.  But our point is that in the absence of a definable and recordable purpose for PBCs, these 
entities tend to resort to soft value statements, assertions which can be trumped by shareholder 
wishes and profit-minded actions.  Moreover, the implementation of these value statements is hard 
to assess and often merely anecdotal.  Nor do these value statements allow assessment of the 
company’s total conduct.  These issues are only likely to be exacerbated in the public markets 
 
60 Lemonade Website, The Lemonade Giveback, available at https://www.lemonade.com/giveback (“Lemonade takes a flat fee 
and treats the rest of the money as yours, not ours. We use it to pay claims, and give what’s left to charities you choose, so we 
never fight over the same coin.”) (last accessed Sept. 15, 2020).  
61 Lemonade had no profits but these figures are comparable to publicly traded corporations.  According to one recent survey, the 
300 largest companies on the Fortune 500 list provided about 1% of pretax profits to charity.  The highest was Gilead at 2.9% 
($338 million).  See Ben Paynter, Big companies donate a smaller percentage of their income than regular people, FastCompany, 
Sept. 13, 2018, available at https://www.fastcompany.com/90233934/big-companies-donate-a-small-percentage-of-their-income-
than-regular-people (last accessed Sept. 15, 2020). 
62 Lemonade, PBC, Lemonade’s 2020 Giveback Hits New High, Backing 34 Nonprofits Chosen By Customers, dated at Aug. 6, 
2020, available at https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200806005610/en/Lemonade%E2%80%99s-2020-Giveback-
Hits-New-High-Backing-34-Nonprofits-Chosen-By-Customers 
63 See, e.g., Kristin Broughton, Lemonade CFO Promotes Do-Good Status, Path to Profitability to New Investors, THE WALL. ST. 
J., Aug. 30, 3030, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/lemonade-cfo-promotes-do-good-status-path-to-profitability-to-new-
investors-11598792401 (observing that investors are demanding Lemonade provide information on its strategy for achieving 
profitability). 
64 KICKSTARTER PBC 2018 BENEFIT STATEMENT, at 2, available at https://d3mlfyygrfdi2i.cloudfront.net/ugm6tgt9-
FINAL_PBC_Report_20190902.pdf (last accessed Sept. 15, 2020).  
65 Jack Kelly, Employees Cast a Historic Vote to Unionize at Kickstarter, FORBES, Feb. 19, 2020, available at 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2020/02/19/employees-cast-a-historic-vote-to-unionize-at-kickstarter/#7025745d4822 
where the structure of investment, compensation and shareholder rights will push PBCs to replicate 
the regular corporation in ultimate operations and objections.  
 
IV. PBCs and Accountable Purpose  
 
 Our review indicates that the legal structure of PBCs, like that of traditional corporations, 
is shareholder-centric.  Similarly, although PBCs are theoretically constrained by the requirement 
that they articulate a social purpose, we find that the largest PBCs appear frequently to articulate 
a social purpose that is vague and unmeasurable.  We are thus skeptical that many of the economic 
and other benefits that some commentators have argued can be achieved through the broader use 
of publicly-traded PBCs can be realized under the current PBC form.   Similarly we question the 
extent to which encouraging or requiring that companies convert to PBCs will produce any 
meaningful change in their conduct.  
 
A. The PBC Commitment Problem – Two Case Studies 
 
 We do not think this means that the PBC form cannot be used effectively by publicly-
traded companies.  Rather we believe that the PBC has the potential to offer a meaningful 
opportunity for business participants to implement a broader societal mission.  The  potential value 
of a PBC includes the ability of founders and stockholders to precommit to a particular social 
mission and to formalize their agreement on the objectives and priorities of that mission.  However, 
we also identify the risk that, for publicly-traded PBCs, such broader benefits may be trumped by 
stockholders expressing ordinary concerns about economic value.  The experience of two well-
known corporations illustrates this point. 
 
 The first is Etsy.  Etsy went public in 2015 as a certified B-Corp.  Its Registration Statement 
emphasized its status as a B-corp, stating “[f]undamentally, we believe that companies can and 
should use the power of business to create social good, which is reflected in our status as a Certified 
B Corporation. Our commitment to using business as a force of good manifests itself in the way 
we run our business.”66 
 
 However, as soon as Etsy went public, it faced pressure from market forces to change the 
way it operated.  As the N.Y. Times reported in 2017: 
 
By late last year, expenses were growing fast. And even as the company reported $88 
million in revenues during the third quarter, it posted a net loss of $2.5 million. After a few 
quarters of tepid results, investors grew impatient and a classic clash of corporate 
governance came spilling into view — how would a company like Etsy balance the short-
term demands of its shareholders with its high-minded long-term mission?67 
 
 The result was a return to shareholder primacy.  The board, under shareholder pressure, 
terminated the CEO and replaced him with a new CEO from Skype.  The company laid off 8% of 
its staff in connection with the CEO replacement.  An activist shareholder, Black-and-White 
Capital, took a position in the company and a board seat.  And private equity firms then stepped 
 
66 Etsy, Inc. Registration Statement on Form S-1, at p. 92.  
67 Gelles, supra note 8. 
in to provide capital but on terms that demanded a greater focus on economics.  The company 
subsequently terminated its B-Corp certification.  We offer the events of Etsy as a cautionary tale, 
but also as real evidence that the current PBC form can readily be usurped by market forces.   
 
 The case of Ben and Jerry’s is also illuminating. Although Ben & Jerry’s, a publicly-traded 
one organized under the laws of Vermont, was not a PBC, it espoused a broad social purpose 
similar to that of the PBC.  Among other things, Ben & Jerry’s committed to donating 7.5% of its 
pretax profits to charity through the Ben & Jerry’s Foundation.  Ben & Jerry’s was eventually 
bought by Unilever in 2000.  Both Ben and Jerry have individually attributed the sale to the 
requirements of the board’s fiduciary duties to act in the interest of shareholders.68 There is some 
dispute over this matter, but regardless the company was subject to the market for corporate 
control.  Lacking majority control, Ben and Jerry could not block a takeover.69   
 
 Today, Ben & Jerry’s is still owned by Unilever and is organized as a private PBC.  Ben 
& Jerry’s has maintained its commitment to engaging in social causes.70  However, Ben & Jerry’s 
still takes social positions but Unilever only donated $2.8 million in 2015 to the Ben & Jerry 
Foundation – about half a percent of the company’s revenue.  It is unclear if the company has 
maintained its pre-acquisition charitable mission rather than become part of a $100 billion plus 
conglomerate.71 
 
 These two examples highlight the issues faced by publicly-traded PBCs.  The absence of a 
clearly-defined social purpose and a mechanism for enforcing that purpose exacerbate the risk that 
social purpose will be abandoned in favor of profit or expediency.  To the extent that the PBC form 
is about marshalling momentum and energy behind the corporation because shareholders and 
stakeholders alike believe it is better than the traditional corporation, then the structural limitations 
that we have identified are not problematic.72  Similarly, the PBC designation may find support in 
the marketplace for the corporation’s social mission, allowing the corporation to do well by doing 
good.   
 
 The problem arises in cases in which social purpose and economic value are not aligned.  
In addition, the PBC is vulnerable to purpose drift, in which its decisionmakers – whether officers, 
director or controlling shareholders – identify alternative social objectives or priorities at the 
potential expenses of other stakeholders who have committed to relationships with the corporation 
premised on priorities that have fallen out of favor.  The PBC form may also serve as a vehicle for 
corporate greenwashing – purporting to pursue a social mission while failing to do so, for the 
 
68 Anthony Page & Robert A. Katz, The Truth About Ben & Jerry’s, STANFORD SOCIAL INNOVATION REVIEW (Fall 2012).  
69 Notably the increasing tendency of at least some founders to use dual class stock to retain voting control after taking a 
company public offers a potential way to insulate a PBC’s social purpose from some of this vulnerability.  
70 Ben and Jerry’s mission is now “a three-part mission that aims to create linked prosperity for everyone that’s connected to our 
business: suppliers, employees, farmers, franchisees, customers, and neighbors alike.”  Ben & Jerry’s Website, Our Values, 
available at https://www.benjerry.com/values (last accessed Sept. 15, 2020).  
71 Somewhat surprisingly, neither the Ben & Jerry’s page on the Unilever website or the page for the Ben & Jerry’s Foundation 
appear to contain any recent financial information. See Ben & Jerry’s, https://www.unileverusa.com/brands/food-and-drink/ben-
and-jerrys.html; and Ben & Jerry’s Foundation, https://benandjerrysfoundation.org/about-us.html.    
72 Indeed, consistency and monitoring facilitate a PBC’s ability to capitalize on its social objectives in the market.  See, e.g., J. 
Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware's Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV 345, 
357 (stressing the importance of consistency, monitoring and enforcement to maintain a useful brand). 
purpose of obtaining the social capital and goodwill associated with that mission,  Most 
problematically, the current requirements of the PBC do little to ensure that the PBC is truly 
operated in an effort to pursue social benefit. 
.  
 These concerns are exacerbated by the recent amendments to the Delaware statute and the 
MBCA which facilitate the conversion from a PBC to a traditional corporation.  A majority of 
shareholders can abandon social purpose to the detriment of both the minority shareholders and 
other stakeholders that have entered into relationships with the corporation based on a commitment 
that proves illusory.    
 
B. A Concrete Statement of Purpose 
 
 Our proposed solution to the PBC commitment problem is twofold. First, we argue that 
PBCs should set forth a more concrete, measurable social purpose in their charter.  This would 
allow the board and shareholders to set expectations about the exact social mission of the PBC up 
front.  And it would allow non-shareholder stakeholders, including customers, employees and 
regulators, to evaluate the performance on the company against its social purpose claims.  
 
 What do we mean by a clear social purpose?  We suggest several considerations.  First a 
PBC should identify a discrete primary purpose, which can be unidirectional, such as minimizing 
pollution or multifaceted, such as furthering the interests of an identified set of stakeholders.  
Where the identified purpose encompasses multiple objectives, it should designate those goals that 
the corporation will prioritize, recognizing the potential need to trade-off between competing 
objectives such as low prices and responsible supply chain practices.73  We further suggest that the 
social purpose be articulated in terms that can be measured or benchmarked against publicly-
available standards.  Reducing workplace accidents, maintaining a net-zero carbon footprint, 
increasing the number of loans to minority-owned businesses are examples.   
 
 To be clear, we are not advocating narrowing what qualifies as a public purpose.  The PBC 
is a new business form, and there are multiple paths to improving society.  We expect that some 
PBCs will articulate a very specific purpose, such as Patagonia’s commitment to environmental 
responsibility, while others will seek to minimize externalities with respect to a range of 
stakeholders.  Our proposal is merely that both shareholders and other stakeholders have the tools 
to differentiate among these purposes and to hold a particular PBC accountable to the goals that it 
sets for itself.  Toward that end, we advocate greater attention to meaningful mechanisms for 
imposing such accountability, mechanisms that we discuss in the next section.   
 
C. Accountability Mechanisms 
 
 A measurable and discrete social purpose only gets us half the way to enabling meaningful 
commitment by PBCs.  So long as the charter is sufficiently concrete, it should be clear that a 
corporation has departed from its public purpose.  The other piece of the equation is a mechanism 
for addressing that departure.   
 
 
73 For further discussion of this approach, see Roxanne Thorelli, Note: Providing Clarity for Standard of Conduct for Directors 
Within Benefit Corporations: Requiring Priority of a Specific Public Benefit, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1749, 1769-1770 (2017). 
 Several approaches are possible in this regard.  One possibility is to revise PBC statutes to 
enable shareholders to impose meaningful accountability. Because of the PBC’s shareholder-
centric structure, a PBC is unlikely to be vulnerable to either abandonment of its purpose or drift 
unless a majority of shareholders are complicit.  At a minimum, minority shareholder litigation in 
the form of a derivative suit could provide a meaningful mechanism for redress.  We note that 
existing PBC statutes constrain shareholder litigation even beyond the protections provided to 
corporate decisionmaking in traditional corporations.  The Delaware statute does not permit 
shareholder litigation unless initiated by at least 2% of the outstanding shares, and the statute 
expands the scope of the business judgment rule and the definition of good faith to insulate director 
decisions further.  We question whether those constraints are appropriate or if they are likely to 
result in suboptimal levels of accountability.74  The institutionalization of the securities markets 
means that a relatively small percentage of public-company stock is owned by retail shareholders, 
and institutional investors face a variety of structural and reputational constraints that make their 
leadership in policing PBCs unlikely.75  Given the lack of availability of money damages (a 
limitation we would retain), the potential for frivolous or lawyer-driven litigation in this area seems 
unlikely.  
 
 We do not want to overstate the value of shareholder litigation however.  In particular, we 
note that in other arenas shareholder litigation has resulted in significant costs and little benefit.  
In addition, facilitating shareholder litigation still leaves enforcement in the hands of shareholders, 
an approach that, for the reasons discussed above, is problematic in that shareholders arguably 
have the control to maintain the PBC’s commitment to its social purpose through their voting 
power as well as the incentive to abandon that commitment in favor of economic value.76  An 
alternative is to increase the role of other stakeholders. Brett McDonnell has suggested that 
stakeholder power is the tool to enhancing a firm’s ability to commit to social enterprise.77  Such 
power could be created through allocating voting rights to some non-shareholder stakeholders or 
by providing for stakeholder representation on the board of directors.  Elizabeth Warren’s 
Accountable Capitalism Act78 and Germany’s codetermination regime79 offer examples of ways 
in which to implement greater stakeholder power.   
 
 A third option is public enforcement.  The commitments of non-profit corporations are 
enforced, in part by State Attorneys General, although in practice such enforcement actions are 
rare. As Evelyn Brody has observed, “as a practical matter, few state attorneys general have the 
funding and inclination to engage in aggressive charity enforcement.”80 Another option is to 
 
74 See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S. Benefit Corporations, 40 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 638 (2017) (arguing that “by affording a right of action only to derivative plaintiffs having a requisite 
percentage or dollar value of shareholdings, benefit corporation laws may decrease the prospect of fiduciary duty enforcement 
litigation”). 
75 Cf. Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 435, 462-64 (2012) (observing that the 
3% minimum ownership requirements of the SEC’s proxy access rule was sufficiently high as to make its use unlikely).   
76 See, e.g., Thomas J. White, Benefit Corporations: Increased Oversight through Creation of the Benefit Corporation 
Commission, 41 J. LEGIS. 329, 347 (2015) (questioning whether shareholders will protect stakeholders interests when those 
interests conflict with their own).  
77 Brett H. McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure to Power and Participation in Social Enterprise, 70 ALA. L. REV. 77 (2018). 
78 The Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018). 
79 See, e.g., Jens Dammann, & Horst G. M. Eidenmueller, Codetermination: A Poor Fit for U.S. Corporations (April 1, 2020), 
European Corporate Governance Institute - Law Working Paper No. 509/2020, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3565955 
(explaining Germany’s system of codetermination and arguing that it is a poor fit for US corporations). 
80 Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 939 (2004). 
incorporate PBC disclosure requirements into federal securities reporting, an approach that would 
enable the Securities & Exchange Commission to provide public enforcement.81  Still another 
approach would be to create a specialized regulator to impose accountability and enforce 
stakeholder interests.82   
 
 Other commentators have explored these proposals in further detail than space constraints 
permit here.  We merely note the existence of a range of options that, coupled with a concrete 
statement of purpose, have the potential to enhance the PBC’s commitment to its mission.   
 
D. Conversion   
 
 In addition to a PBC’s general operations, there is also the issue of conversion.  A PBC’s 
shareholders retain the right to convert it back to a traditional corporation, a right that has become 
even easier under the newly-amended Delaware statute and analogous amendments to the 
MPBCA.  One way to prevent this conversion right from undermining a PBC’s commitment to its 
social purpose would be interpreting such a conversation as akin to a fundamental change of 
control under Revlon in which fiduciary duties would require the board to make a determination 
that such a change was in the best interests of the company.  Because PBC statutes define the 
PBC’s best interests to incorporate its designated social purpose, a board presumably need not 
approve an opportunistic conversion that sacrifices the interests of minority shareholders, 
stakeholders or the public at large.  Moreover, the basis on which a board evaluated the 
corporation’s best interests would be subject to judicial review.  However, like the reform 
proposals on accountability we raise in the prior subsection, this too requires more thought and 
study which we intend to take forward in further work.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 The PBC is a new, highly-touted form and the publicly-traded PBC a relative baby.  
However, as more companies in the public market face public pressure to utilize the PBC corporate 
form, it will be important to keep fundamental principles of the PBC in mind, namely preserving 
its social purpose.  As we have outlined in this chapter, preserving that social purpose may be 
difficult for publicly-traded PBCs.  The reasons are that the fundamental structure of PBCs 
preserves a shareholder primacy norm while subjecting the PBC to the forces of the capital markets 
which push regular corporations into profit-oriented decisions.  In addition, the vague and 
unenforceable purpose put forth by PBCs will not provide any barriers to this drift and the possible 
conflicts it creates. 
 
 We advocate that publicly-traded PBCs adopt a more specific and definite corporate 
purpose as a partial solution to these concerns.  A concrete social purpose would provide a basis 
for stakeholders to evaluate the PBC’s mission and to determine their compatibility with its 
objectives on an ex ante basis.  Going forward, the PBC’s board adherence to the purpose would 
be subject to fiduciary principles and the prospect of potential shareholder enforcement.  While a 
 
81 See, e.g., Brent J. Horton, Rising to Their Full Potential: How a Uniform Disclosure Regime Will Empower Benefit 
Corporations, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101, 104 (2019) (proposing a uniform disclosure regime for PBCs enforceable by the SEC 
through cease-and-desist proceedings). 
82 See, e.g., White, supra note 76, at 346-52 (2015) (advocating for the creation of a Benefit Corporation Commission which 
would act as a more reliable guardian of stakeholder interests). 
finding that a board failed to adhere to its social purpose, thereby violating the duties of care or 
good faith, would presumably be quite high and essentially require a process-based consideration 
of purpose in good-faith, we believe that this would be a significant guidepost to ensure a PBC 
maintains its social purpose.  Otherwise and in the absence of our proposals, we see no significant 
difference between the legal structure and mission of a PBC and a traditional corporation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit A 
Significant PBCs and Their Legal Social Purpose 
 
Private Companies83 
 
Company 
Name 
Statement  
AltSchool, 
PBC 
(Name Change Amendment Filed 10/08/2014) 
Article III: Purpose  
The Corporation is a public benefit corporation organized under the General 
Corporation Law and the Corporation has elected to be subject to Section 361 of the 
General Corporate Law. The Corporation shall have a public benefit purpose of 
creating a material positive impact on society and to operate in a responsible and 
sustainable manner, as required under Section 363 of the General Corporate Law. 
This impact shall be assessed by evaluating the business and operations of the 
Corporation as a whole. The Corporation also has a specific public benefit purpose to 
promote innovation in education and improved access to quality schooling.  
MPOWER 
Financing 
(Filed 04/01/2014) 
Article III: The specific public benefit purpose of the corporation is to: Lending to 
Students of Low-Income Backgrounds 
Qwil (Filed 07/08/2019) 
Article III: The purpose of the Corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity 
for which a corporation may be organized under the General Corporation Law of the 
State of Delaware, as the same exists or as may hereafter be amended from time to 
time. The specific public benefit purpose of the Corporation is to create a material 
positive impact on society, taken as a whole, as assessed against a third-party 
standard, from the business and operations of this Corporation.  
Ripple Foods, 
PBC 
(Filed 12/15/2014) 
Article III: Purpose: The Corporation is a public benefit corporation organized under 
the General Corporation Law and the Corporation has elected to be subject to Section 
 
83 Top-ten PBC recipients of venture capital funding per Dorff, et al., supra note 19. 
361 of the General Corporation Law. The Corporation shall have a public benefit 
purpose of producing a material positive impact on society and the environment, taken 
as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and operations 
of a public benefit corporation, as required under Section 362 of the General 
Corporation Law. This impact shall be assessed by evaluating the business and 
operations of the Corporation as a whole. 
Allbirds, Inc. 
(Bozz) 
(Filed 07/19/2016) 
THIRD: The nature of the business or purposes to be conducted or promoted is to 
engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized under 
the General Corporation Law. The Corporation shall be a public benefit corporation as 
contemplated by subchapter XV of the General Corporation Law, or any successor 
provisions, that it is intended to operate in a responsible and sustainable manner and 
to produce a public benefit or benefit, and is to be managed in a manner that balances 
the stockholders pecuniary interests, the best interests of those materially affected by 
the corporation’s conduct and the public benefit or benefits identified in this 
certificate of incorporation. If the General Corporation Law is amended to alter or 
further define the management and operation of public benefit corporations, then the 
Corporation shall be managed and operated in accordance with the General 
Corporation Law as so amended. In addition, the Corporation will promote the 
following public benefits: environmental conservation and upward social mobility for 
low-income communities. 
Data.World, 
Inc. 
Original Certificate (Filed 09/10/2015):  
THIRD: The purpose of the Corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for 
which a corporation may be organized under the General Corporation Law of 
Delaware. 
 
Second Amended and Restated Certificate (Filed 07/11/2017):  
ARTICLE II 
Purpose. The purpose of this Corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for 
which corporations may be organized under the Delaware General Corporation Law. 
Public Benefit Corporation. The Corporation shall be a public benefit corporation as 
contemplated by subchapter XV of the Delaware General Corporation Law, or any 
successor provisions, that it is intended to operate in a responsible and sustainable 
manner and to produce a public benefit or benefits, and is to be managed in a manner 
that balances the stockholders’ pecuniary interests, the best interests of those 
materially affected by the Corporation’s conduct and the public benefit or benefits 
identified in this Certificate. If the Delaware General Corporation Law is amended to 
alter or further define the management and operation of public benefit corporations, 
then the Corporation shall be managed and operated in accordance with the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, as so amended.  
Specific Purposes and Benefits. The specific public benefit purposes of the 
Corporation are to (a) strive to build the most meaningful, collaborative and abundant 
data resource in the world in order to maximize data’s societal problem-solving 
utility, (b) advocate publicly for improving the adoption, usability, and proliferation 
of open data and linked data, and (c) serve as an accessible historical repository of the 
world’s data.  
To the extent that any provision of this ARTICLE II is found to be invalid or 
unenforceable, such invalidity or unenforceability shall not affect the validity or 
enforceability of any other provision of this ARTICLE II. 
Fish+People, 
Inc. 
(Filed 05/03/2017) 
THIRD:  
A. The nature of the business of purposes to be conducted or promoted is to 
engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized under 
the General Corporation Law. The purpose of the Corporation shall include creating a 
material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, from the 
business and operations of the Corporation.  
B. The public benefits to be promoted by the Corporation include the delivery of 
nourishing food and supporting the local and global environment.  
Meow Wolf, 
LLC 
(Filed 11/26/2016) 
ARTICLE THREE: The purpose of the Corporation is to engage in any lawful act or 
activity for which corporations may be organized under the General Corporation Law 
of the State of Delaware. 
ARTICLE FOUR: The Corporation shall be a public benefit corporation as 
contemplated by subchapter XV of the Delaware General Corporation Law, or any 
successor provisions, that it is intended to operate in a responsible and sustainable 
manner and to produce a public benefit or benefit, and is to be managed in a manner 
that balances the stockholders pecuniary interests, the best interests of those 
materially affected by the Corporation’s conduct and the public benefit or benefits 
identified in this certificate of incorporation. 
ARTICLE FIVE: As its specific purpose, the Corporation shall employ artists and 
creatives to work collaboratively in a sustainable manner to create immersive arts 
exhibits and other public oriented innovations. These exhibitions shall seek to provide 
positive experiences, economic development, and community betterment. 
Furthermore, in order to advance the best interests of those materially affected by the 
Corporation’s conduct, it is intended that the business and operations of the 
Corporation create a material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as 
a whole.  
Global 
Uprising, PBC 
(Filed 10/02/2013)  
ARTICLE III: The purpose of this corporation is to engage in any lawful act or 
activity for which a corporation may be organized under the Delaware General 
Corporation Law. This corporation shall have a specific public benefit purpose of 
using its business to inspire social and environmental change that results in the 
improvement of the human condition, increased social consciousness and the 
amelioration of poverty.  
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Company 
Name 
Statement 
 
84 Publicly-traded PBCs as of October 1, 2020. 
Lemonade, 
Inc. 
(Executed June 25, 2019) 
ARTICLE III: The purpose of this corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity 
for which a corporation may be organized under the Delaware General Corporation 
Law. 
 
Benefit Corporation. This corporation shall be a public benefit corporation as 
contemplated by subchapter XV of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the 
“DGCL”), or any successor provisions, that it is intended to operate in a responsible 
and sustainable manner and to produce a public benefit or benefits, and is to be 
managed in a manner that balances the stockholders pecuniary interests, the best 
interests of those materially affected by this corporation’s conduct and the public 
benefit or benefits identified in this certificate of incorporation. Accordingly, it is 
intended that the business and operations of this corporation create a material positive 
impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole. If the DGCL is amended to 
alter or further define the management and operation of public benefit corporations, 
then this corporation shall be managed and operated in accordance with the DGCL, as 
so amended. 
 
Purposes. This corporation’s public benefit purpose is to harness novel business 
models, technologies and private-nonprofit partnerships to deliver insurance products 
where charitable giving is a core feature, for the benefit of communities and their 
common causes. The nature of the business or purposes to be conducted or promoted is 
to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized under 
the General Corporation Law.  
Vital Farms, 
Inc. 
(Executed 07/05/2020) 
THIRD: The nature of the business or purposes to be conducted or promoted by the 
Corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations, including 
Public Benefit Corporations (“PBCs”), may be organized under the General 
Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the “DGCL”), including without limitation 
the following public benefits: (i) bringing ethically produced food to the table; (ii) 
bringing joy to our customers through products and services; (iii) allowing crew 
members to thrive in an empowering, fun environment; (iv) fostering lasting 
partnerships with our farmers and suppliers; (v) forging an enduring profitable 
business; and (vi) being stewards of our animals, land, air, and water, and being 
supportive of our community.  
Laureate 
Education, 
Inc. 
(Executed 01/2017) 
ARTICLE II: The purpose of the Corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity 
for which a corporation may be organized under the DGCL. The specific public benefit 
purpose of the Corporation is to produce a positive effect (or a reduction of negative 
effects) for society and persons by offering diverse education programs delivered 
online and on premises operated in the communities that we serve, as the board of 
directors may from time to time determine to be appropriate and within the 
Corporation’s overall education mission.  
 
 
 
